Kathryn Moss, Ph.D.*, Michael Ullman, M.A.,
Matthew C. Johnsen, Ph.D., Barbara E.
Starrett, M.H.A., and Scott Burris, J.D.
Under Title I of the ADA, individuals who believe they
have been subjected to disability-based employment
discrimination may le an administrative charge. This
article looks at who les charges, over what issues, and
with what outcomes in both Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission (EEOC) eld oces, and state and
local fair employment practice agencies (FEPAs). The
data for the article are computerized records of all ADA
charges led through March 31, 1998. The data indicate
that individuals who rely on a FEPA to investigate their
charge have a greater likelihood of obtaining a benecial
outcome than individuals who rely on the EEOC, but
proportionately more individuals receiving a benecial
outcome are likely to receive monetary benets from the
EEOC than from a FEPA. Further, those who receive
benecial outcomes will probably receive greater monet-
ary benets from charges investigated by the EEOC than
from those investigated by a FEPA. Copyright # 1999
John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
INTRODUCTION
Under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), individuals who
believe they have been discriminated against in employment on the basis of a
disability may le an administrative charge. The charge initiates an administrative
dispute resolution process. Aggrieved individuals may also le a lawsuit, but only
after pursuing their administrative remedies.
The US Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has primary
enforcement authority for Title I. It shares responsibility with state and local Fair
CCC 07353936/99/01002918$17.50
Copyright # 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Behavioral Sciences and the Law
Behav. Sci. Law 17: 2946 (1999)
* Correspondence to: Kathryn Moss, PhD, Cecil G. Sheps Center for Health Services Research,
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, 725 Airport Rd, Campus Box 7590, Chapel Hill, NC 27599-
7590, USA.
Contract grant sponsor: National Institue of Mental Health; Contract grant number: ROI-MH57077.
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Employment Practice Agencies (FEPAs) for receiving and investigating employ-
ment discrimination charges. The FEPAs enforce anti-discrimination laws in states
and localities that are similar to the federal antidiscrimination laws. The EEOC has
50 eld oces in 33 states and the District of Columbia. There are 125 FEPAs in
48 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. Usually,
an individual may le a charge with either the EEOC or a FEPA. Either way, the
charge is considered ``dual-led'' under both the ADA and the applicable state or
local law. FEPA investigations of charges that are dual-led under the ADA or
other federal employment discrimination laws are carried out under contractual
arrangements with the EEOC. Thus, the EEOC maintains oversight responsibility
for the work FEPAs conduct (State and Local Task Force, 1995).
This article is part of a larger study of the ADA employment discrimination
charge process. 1 Previous articles focused on the time period of July 26, 1992 (the
eective date of Title I implementation) through June 30, 1995 (Moss & Johnsen,
1997; Moss, Johnsen, & Ullman, 1998; Moss, in press). This article updates these
analyses, extending the time period through March 31, 1998.
One purpose of the larger study is to monitor who is making use of the charge
process and why. Complainants can be characterized by type of impairment, as
well as issues over which charges are led. The empirical study of who is ling
complaints allows us to understand whether the ADA is fullling Congressional
intent; that is, whether the people making use of the charge process are the ones
Congress intended to serve.
A second purpose of the larger investigation is to evaluate the benets obtained
by individuals who le charges under Title I. For this purpose, one of the main
outcomes is whether individuals receive any benets as a result of ling an ADA
employment discrimination charge. The type of benets received is also considered
(e.g., hiring, reinstatement, reasonable accommodation, cash settlements, and the
amount of money involved). A third purpose of the ongoing study is to identify
factors that are associated with those who receive benets.
In this article, we look at who les charges, over what issues, and with what
outcomes in both EEOC eld oces and FEPAs. Summary ndings are listed
below with details and discussion to follow:
(i) Since Title I went into eect (July 26, 1992), back and psychiatric impair-
ments have been the most commonly claimed impairment in ADA-based
charges. Other common claims have included neurological impairments and
impairments related to extremities (i.e., loss of limbs or digits and non-
paralytic orthopedic impairments of hands, legs, feet, and shoulders).
(ii) Discharge has been the most commonly cited issue over which ADA-based
charges have been led. Other commonly cited issues have included failure
to provide reasonable accommodations, terms and conditions of the job
(i.e., allegations of inequitable rules or denial of applications of rules
1 In March 1995, the rst author obtained an Intergovernmental Personnel Act (IPA) position at the
EEOC. This gave her access to two kinds of data: (i) the EEOC's computerized data system which
includes detailed information on every charge the EEOC receives, as well as those which are dual-led
with FEPAs, and (ii) investigative les for charges led with the EEOC. In working with the data and
before publishing or disseminating the data or reports based on the data, the author and research sta are
subject to the condentiality provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as incorporated into
the ADA.
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pertaining to overall working conditions and employment privileges irredu-
cible to monetary value), harassment, failure to hire, and discipline.
(iii) People tend to have very dierent charge outcomes depending on whether their
charge is investigated by a FEPA or an EEOC eld oce. Charges investigated
by a FEPA are more likely to result in benets for people who le them than
charges investigated by the EEOC. However, charges investigated by the
EEOC are more likely to result in greater actual monetary benets for people
who le them than those investigated by a FEPA.
(iv) People may receive very dierent charge outcomes, depending on which
particular EEOC oce or FEPA processes their charge.
(v) Regardless of whether a charge is investigated by the EEOC or by a FEPA,
only a small percentage of charges result in new hires or reinstatements for
people with disabilities. On the other hand, more than 2,400 individuals with
disabilities have either been hired into new jobs or had their old jobs
reinstated, and over 22,000 individuals have received benets of some kind in
the 5 1 2 years since Title I took eect.
(vi) Regardless of whether a charge is investigated by the EEOC or by a FEPA, the
percentage of ADA complainants who receive benecial charge closures,
such as settlements or conciliation agreements, has declined during the
past three years. However, the size of monetary awards complainants receive
has increased. Also, the percentage of cases in which the EEOC has found
``reasonable cause to believe that discrimination occurred'' has risen
considerably.
STUDYING THE EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
CHARGE PROCESS
The all-too-frequent gap between the promise of public policies and their
implementation has been much discussed (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1973; Murphy,
1974; Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975; Bardach, 1977; Moss, 1987, 1992; Wilson,
1989; Blumrosen, 1993). The ADA promises active and eective enforcement,
however. As stated by Congress, it aims ``to provide clear, strong, consistent,
enforceable standards addressing discrimination against individuals with disabil-
ities'' and ``to ensure that the Federal Government plays a central role in enforcing
the standards established in this Act on behalf of individuals with disabilities''
(42 U.S.C. x12101(b)(2) and (3) (Supp. 1992)). Thus, our ongoing study of the
employment discrimination charge process represents an attempt to determine the
extent to which the legislative intent translates into benets for people with
disabilities.
An evolving goal of the study is to situate our research ndings within the larger
context of trends in equal employment opportunity law. The level of charge
activity will reect at least three variables: the rate of employer compliance with the
ADA's requirements, the size of the population protected by the ADA, and the
willingness of individuals who believe they have been subject to discrimination to
le charges (Burris & Moss, in press). All three variables are uid over time,
inuenced by such factors as judicial interpretations of who is covered by the law
and perceptions of the charge process and its outcomes.
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In earlier work, we argued that several factors have created a climate favorable
for individuals who feel they have been subject to employment discrimination
(Moss, Johnsen, & Ullman, 1998). Among these are the presence of the EEOC and
other governmental agencies created to enforce employment discrimination laws,
the informal activities of the EEOC and other enforcement agencies, the low cost
and relative ease of ling claims with the EEOC and FEPAs, the ling of more than
a million employment discrimination charges since the passage of the 1964 Civil
Rights law, the settling of hundreds of thousands of charges in favor of com-
plainants during this same time period, and the tens of thousands of employment
discrimination lawsuits led during this period. In addition to increasing the
willingness of individuals to le charges in good faith, these factors could also
encourage employees to le mendacious claims or to le in retaliation for
employment decisions actually unrelated to disability.
There are also signicant factors at work that may be reducing the use of the
charge process by people with disabilities who believe they have experienced
discrimination. Empirical research suggests that most people who suer discrim-
ination and other legally recognized injuries do not sue (Felstiner, Abel, & Sarat,
1980; Kritzer, Vidmar, & Bogart, 1991; Burris & Moss, in press). Although
individuals' awareness of ADA litigation has not been studied, a strong trend in the
federal courts toward narrowly interpreting the ADA's denition of disability
could be reducing willingness to bring legal claims (Frierson, 1997).
The eect of litigation and other contextual factors on employer compliance and
the number of charges is complex. Employers who perceive that courts are
interpreting the ADA narrowly, and are even hostile to the statute, might be more
likely to assume that certain impairments are not protected disabilities or to refuse
proposed accommodations as unreasonable. This could be expected to lead to more
charges, particularly among individuals whose impairments diverge from popular
conceptions of disability (e.g., we would expect to see more charges involving back
problems or psychiatric disabilities, and fewer involving serious vision impair-
ments or paraplegia, if employers are applying a narrow denition of disability).
Similarly, employers may regard the reasonable accommodation requirement of
the ADA as a species of ``armative action'' and interpret court decisions limiting
armative action programs as signaling a repudiation of ADA requirements
(Rubenfeld, 1997). On the other hand, the perception by employers that the
ADA is stringently enforced and entails signicant costs in defending charges
may encourage greater compliance, ultimately reducing the number of charges.
Both forces may play a role as employers learn more about evolving rules:
higher compliance with respect to employees whose impairments are perceived
to clearly fall within the legal denition of disability may be oset by a greater
condence in challenging the applicability of the law to employees with other
impairments.
The US Supreme Court's rst decision interpreting the ADA, handed down
in June 1998, held that a person with asymptomatic HIV infection was disabled
under the law (Bragdon v. Abbott, 1998). The decision's liberal approach to
interpreting the ADA will probably reverse the narrowing trend in the lower courts
to some extent. A broader approach to dening disability in the courts could be
expected to inuence the behavior of employees and employers and, ultimately, the
number of charges.
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Changes in the way the EEOC processes charges may also inuence the out-
comes of the charge process. From the early 1980s through June 1995, EEOC
policy required full investigations of all charges (even those that appeared ground-
less upon intake). To reduce this large inventory of uninvestigated charges, the
EEOC changed its policy in June 1995. The newer policy requires EEOC eld
oce personnel to assign charges to one of three categories: (A) charges which fall
within the EEOC's national or local enforcement plans (i.e., plans identifying
priority issues for administrative enforcement and litigation) or charge for which
there seems a high likelihood that discrimination has occurred are to be fully
investigated; (B) charges for which evidence of discrimination is inconclusive are to
receive further investigation to reclassify them into either ``A'' for full investigation
or ``C'' for dismissal; (C) charges for which there is little or virtually no evidence of
discrimination or charges in which the charging party or the employer is not
covered under the ADA are to be dismissed.
A March 1998 EEOC report, titled Priority Charge Handling and Litigation
Task Force Report, stated that the EEOC's priority charge handling procedures,
together with its National Enforcement Plan, helped the agency progress in many
areas. According to the report, the agency was particularly successful in reducing
its national charge inventory and increasing the number of cases in its docket that
challenge the most serious violations (Igasaki & Miller, 1998). The report provides
a mid-term assessment of the progress of priority charge processing, as well as
litigation reforms, which the EEOC began in 1995. The report did not attempt to
dierentiate the eect of its reforms on enforcement of the dierent laws for which
it has responsibility and thus is not intended to shed light on the impact of the new
charge priority policy on persons with disabilities.
METHODOLOGY
The Data
We obtained the data for this study from the EEOC's Charge Data System (CDS).
The CDS is used by the agency to monitor and track processing and investigation
of charges. It is also used to prepare informational, management, and statistical
reports. It is operational in all EEOC oces. FEPAs also are linked to the CDS.
Both EEOC eld oces and FEPAs continuously enter and update information in
the CDS system. When data are entered and updated, one copy is stored in local
CDS databases, while another is transmitted to a computer at EEOC Head-
quarters. The latter computer consolidates the transmitted data, merging them into
the national database which maintains data pertaining to discrimination charges
(US General Accounting Oce, 1989).
The EEOC requires its eld oces and FEPAs to enter standardized informa-
tion about each charging party and charge into the CDS. This information
includes the individual's impairment, race, national origin, gender, and age. It
documents the ling and closing dates of all charges and the EEOC oce or FEPA
where the charge was led, investigated, and closed. It describes the issue(s) over
which the charge was led, the status of the charge (whether it is open or has been
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closed), and, if closed, whether there was a nding of ``cause'' or ``no cause.'' For
all charges closed, it records the specic charge outcome.
While previous articles in the larger investigation explained that the EEOC was
not able to provide us with all of its ADA data in computerized form (Moss, 1996;
Moss, Johnsen, & Ullman, 1998; Moss, in press), the data reported in this article
come from a computerized data set of records of all ADA charges led from the
date of implementation of Title I (July 26, 1992) through March 31, 1998.
Data Analysis
Simple percentages were calculated in analyzing kinds of impairment most often
cited in ADA charges, alleged violations cited in charges, and the outcomes of
charges. We have not conducted signicance tests for this paper. Tests of signi-
cance are designed to help in making decisions about population parameters.
Because all our analyses provide actual population parameters of ADA-based
charges and charging parties, signicance testing is inappropriate. 2
RESULTS
Number of Charge Filings
In the period between the eective date of Title I (July 26, 1992) and March 31,
1998, 175,226 charges had been led under the ADA. Of these, 57% (n 99,470)
had been led with EEOC eld oces and 43% (n 75,753) had been led with
the FEPAs. 3 Thus, in order to get a complete picture of the impact of the ADA on
employment discrimination it is important to include both cases handled by the
EEOC and those handled by FEPAs.
Impairments Cited in Charges
Of the charges led with the EEOC, individuals with one of four impairments
comprised half of those ling. The four impairments most commonly cited were
back impairments (17.2%; n 17,092), psychiatric impairments (12.4%;
n 12,313), neurological impairments (10.6%; n 10,568), and impairments
related to extremities (i.e., loss of limbs or digits or nonparalytic orthopedic
impairments of hands, legs, feet, and shoulders) (9.5%; n 9,451). Any one of the
many other specic impairment classications represented no more than 4% of all
charges led.
The situation was generally similar with charges led with the FEPAs. The four
impairments most commonly cited were back impairments (12.7%; n 9,630),
psychiatric impairments (9.4%; n 7,141), impairments related to extremities
2 In our previous articles on the administrative charge process, we conducted signicance testing
because some of the data were derived from samples. 3
The EEOC eld oce and FEPA lings total to slightly less than the total number of lings because in
rare instances charges are led at EEOC Headquarters in Washington, DC.
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(9.2%; n 6,935), and neurological impairments (6.6%; n 4,969). Any one of
the other specic impairment classications represented 3.2% or less of all charges
led.
A major dierence between the EEOC and the FEPAs involved ``other impair-
ments.'' Impairments not labeled in the CDS database, called ``other impair-
ments,'' represented 20.4% (n 20,311) of the EEOC charges. In contrast, ``other
impairments'' comprised 32.3% (n 24,493) of FEPA charges.
There was another dierence between the EEOC and FEPAs with respect to
impairments cited in charges. In Particular, in the second half of 1997, psychiatric
disabilities replaced back impairments as the most commonly cited impairment in
Title I charges investigated by EEOC oces. Back impairments remained the most
frequently cited impairment and psychiatric disabilities remained the second most
frequently cited impairment in charges investigated by FEPAS.
Nature of Allegations
The largest percentage of ADA charges led with the EEOC consisted of
individuals alleging they had been illegally discharged (52.4%; n 52,119). This
is consistent with charges led under other laws enforced by the EEOC. Other
alleged violations were failure to provide reasonable accommodations (29.2%;
n 29,088), terms and conditions (13.3%; n 13,193), harassment (12.0%;
n 11,915), hiring (9.3%; n 9,237), and discipline (5.1%; n 5,069). Any one
of the many other classications of allegations were found in less than 5% of the
charges.
The situation with the FEPAs was again similar. The most commonly cited
allegations in charges led with the FEPAs were job termination (54.5%;
n 41,271), terms and conditions (25.2%; n 19,112); reasonable accommo-
dations (12.3%; n 9,307), harassment (9.6%; n 7,262), and hiring (9.3%;
n 7,055). Any one of the many other classications of allegations were found in
3.3% or less of the charges led with the FEPAs.
Again, allegations not labeled at all in the CDS database constituted a large
percentage of FEPA charges, especially relative to the percentage of unlabeled
allegations cited in EEOC charges. Unlabelled allegations constituted 10.7%
(n 8,118) of FEPA charges, but only 3.2% (n 3,173) of EEOC charges.
Whether Individuals Receive Benets
ADA charges can be closed in six ways. Three bring some type of direct benet to
charging parties. ``Withdrawals with benets'' are non-written, informal agree-
ments between employers and charging parties that typically resolve a charge
before the EEOC or a FEPA has completed its investigation and determined the
merits of the charge. ``Settlements'' are formal, written agreements between
employers and charging parties that resolve a charge before the EEOC or a FEPA
issues a letter of determination on the merits of the charge. ``Conciliation agree-
ments'' are formal, written agreements between employers and charging parties
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that resolve a charge after an investigation indicates reasonable cause to believe that
discrimination occurred.
Three other types of closure bring no direct benets to charging parties.
``Unsuccessful conciliations'' are failures to achieve an agreement between
employers and charging parties after an investigation indicates that there is reason-
able cause to believe that discrimination occurred. ``No cause determinations'' are
determinations that there is not reasonable cause to believe that discrimination
occurred. ``Administrative closures'' are charges closed for other reasons without a
determination of cause or no cause (e.g., a determination that the charging party is
not a qualied individual with a disability, a decision that the employer is not a
covered entity under the ADA, or a request by the charging party for a ``right-to-
sue'' letter 180 days after the charge was rst led even if the agency processing is not
complete 4 ).
Table 1 shows that 145,794 ADA charges were closed as of March 31, 1998. Of
these, 15.7% (n 22,883) brought some measure of benet to charging parties.
The data indicate, however, that charges investigated and closed by a FEPA
were more likely to benet complainants in some way than charges investigated and
closed by the EEOC. As Table 1 reveals, 23.3% (n 12,022) of the charges
Table 1. Outcomes of all ADA employment discrimination charges processed and closed by EEOC and
FEPA oces through 31 March 1998.*
Type of closure
EEOC FEPA Total
No. of
closures
% of
total
No. of
closures
% of
total
No. of
closures
% of
total
Withdrawal with benets 5377 5.7 5573 10.8 10956 7.5
Settlements 4311 4.6 5894 11.4 10206 7.0
Successful conciliations 1165 1.2 555 1.1 1721 1.2
Total benets 10853 11.5 12022 23.3 22883 15.7
Unsuccessful conciliations 2023 2.2 124 .2 2148 1.5
No cause determinations 47457 50.5 25969 50.3 73561 50.5
Administrative resolutions 33682 35.8 13486 26.1 47202 32.4
Total nonbenets 83162 88.5 39579 76.7 122911 84.4
Total 94015 100.0 51601 100.0 145794 100.0
* The EEOC eld oce and FEPA closures total to slightly less than the total number of closures
because in rare instances cases are reviewed and susequently closed by EEOC Headquarters. Since these
cases can include cases led with either an EEOC eld oce or a FEPA, we are excluding them from the
comparison of EEOC eld oces and FEPAs.
4 Some right-to-sue letters eventually result in benets for charging parties. In some cases, a charging
party or attorney requests a right-to-sue letter, even if the EEOC or a FEPA has not nished processing
the charge, because the case seems strong. In such cases, the nonbenecial outcome received admini-
stratively may be a strong case where a benecial outcome is receivednot before the agency, but
eventually in court. These cases are not included in the analysis for this paper because the Charge Data
System does not include information about them. They most likely constitute a small group, however,
because the cost of attorneys and the diculty in getting attorneys to take ADA cases prevents most
people from ling lawsuits. Furthermore, there has been an increasing tendency of federal courts to deny
protection to individuals who bring ADA claims. It is also important to note that right-to-sue letters
may also be issued when the EEOC or a FEPA makes a no cause determination or when conciliation
attempts fail and the EEOC decides not to sue on the charging party's behalf. Again, some of these
right-to-sue letters may eventually result in a judicially obtained benecial outcome.
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investigated and closed by a FEPA resulted in some sort of benet, compared to
11.5% (n 10,853) of the charges investigated and closed by the EEOC.
In addition to indicating the number of charges closed, Table 1 also provides
information about determinations by EEOC and FEPA investigators that there is
reasonable cause to think that discrimination occurred. Referred to as ``cause
ndings,'' these can result only in conciliations, either successful or unsuccessful.
The rows in Table 1 describing successful and unsuccessful conciliations represent
only 1.3% of the total FEPA charge closures and 3.4% of the total EEOC charge
closures. These low percentages are consistent with criticisms the EEOC fre-
quently receives for making too few cause determinations (Selmi, 1996; Seymour,
1995, 1997; Blumrosen, 1994, 1993; Norton, 1992; US General Accounting Oce,
1994, 1988, 1987).
It is important to note that withdrawal-with-benet outcomes and formal
settlements probably would have resulted in more ``cause'' determinations if their
investigations had been concluded. It is also important to point out that the
percentage of ``cause'' ndings by the EEOC has increased considerably during the
last several years. This will be discussed in detail later in the paper.
Nature and Amount of Benets
The EEOC's Charge Data System tracks three types of benet resulting from charge
closures. ``Actual monetary benets'' are provided by an employer to the person
making the complaint and/or a group of similarly situated employees through back
pay, remedial relief, compensatory damages, or punitive damages. ``Projected
monetary benets'' are remedies to be provided by an employer during a one-year
time period through hiring, promotion, reinstatement, or accommodations that
would bring monetary returns. ``Nonmonetary benets'' can also be provided
by employers. Examples include providing a charging party with a positive
job reference, referring a charging party to a job, providing a charging party or a
group of similarly situated individuals with union membership, or posting anti-
discrimination notices in an employment setting.
Table 2 shows the actual and projected monetary benets and nonmonetary
benets resulting from charges investigated by EEOC oces and FEPAs that
Table 2. Types of benet received by charging parties from 26 July 1992 through 31 March 1998*
EEOC FEPA Total
Actual monetary
benets
Mean $ per closure $19231 $8370 $13932
Median $ per closure $5646 $2400 $3695
No. of closures 6510 6346 12909
% of total rec'd benets 61.4% 59.2% 60.3%
Projected monetary
benets
Mean $ per closure $24860 $19867 $23691
Median $ per closure $17500 $12916 $16492
No. of closures 2936 910 3851
% of total rec'd benets 27.7% 8.5% 18.0%
Nonmonetary benets No. of closures 3823 4520 8398
% of total rec'd benets 36.1% 42.2% 39.2%
* The computations of this table were based on all ADA-based charges that resulted in benets.
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brought benets to charging parties. The percentage of benecial charges that
resulted in nonmonetary benets was higher for charges investigated by FEPAs
than for charges investigated by EEOC oces. EEOC oce-investigated charges
that resulted in benets for complainants, however, resulted in a higher percentage
of monetary benets, both actual and projected. Also, charges investigated by
EEOC oces that brought benets to complainants resulted in distinctly higher
monetary benets, both actual and projected. 5
Table 2 presents both mean and median monetary benets because both are
important in describing benets resulting from ADA charges. Like many economic
analyses, the distribution of monetary benets is skewed. When describing dollar
amounts received by the ``typical'' charging party, the median is a good alternative
to the mean because the distribution is skewed (in this case, a relatively few charges
have resulted in very high dollar amounts which cause the mean and median to be
quite dierent). When trying to understand the EEOC's recent policy emphasis on
prioritizing particularly strong cases, the mean may be useful in understanding the
overall impact of these higher monetary awards received in such cases.
New Jobs and Reinstatements
Many observers argue that a large percentage of charges of employment discrimina-
tion brought under the ADA are frivolous (Bovard, 1995; Mathews, 1995, 1993;
Will, 1996; Zuri, 1996; Olson, 1997) and that the goal of increasing employment
opportunities for people with serious disabilities has not been met (Auberger, 1994;
Redenbaugh, 1994). In an eort to address this issue, we analyzed the number and
percentage of charges that resulted in new jobs and reinstatements. Table 3 presents
the results of this analysis.
The results in Table 3 support the conclusions of those who argue that only a
small percentage of charges result in increased employment opportunities for
people with disabilities. Although there is a small dierence between charges
investigated by the EEOC and charges investigated by a FEPA with respect to
Table 3. New jobs and reinstatements resulting from ADA employment discrimination charges through
31 March 1998
Closure result
EEOC FEPA Total
No. of
closures
% of
closures
No. of
closures
% of
closures
No. of
closures
% of
closures
New hires and reinstatements 1848 2.0 558 1.1 2407 1.7
All other closures 92167 98.0 51043 98.9 143387 98.3
Total 94015 100.0 51601 100.0 145794 100.0
5 In analyzing the nature and amount of benets, earlier articles in this investigation used individuals as
the unit of analysis, not charges. One article (Moss, in press) set forth the problems with using
individuals rather than charges. Now that data about all ADA charges are available in computerized
form, we are able to change the unit of analysis to charges. The dollar amounts are actually relatively
similar whether individuals or charges are the unit of analysis, but we believe that representing these
outcomes by charges presents a more accurate picture.
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complainants obtaining new jobs or getting old jobs back, neither group had much
success in this area. Table 3 also shows that 2,407 charges resulted in individuals
either being hired into new jobs or having their old jobs reinstated. While this is
not a trivial result for those who were hired or reinstated, it would appear to fall
short of the wide ranging impact expected for the more than 43 million Americans
with disabilities.
The Passage of Time
Implementation researchers have repeatedly found that translating important
legislative and administrative policies into action proceeds slowly (Wilson, 1989;
Goldman, et al., 1992; Blumrosen, 1993). That nding underlies the relatively
optimistic interpretation of our earlier study ndings about ADA employment
discrimination charges: we emphasized that despite the seemingly low benets
received by individuals who had led ADA charges, the initial three years of
Title I implementation saw thousands of people with disabilities receiving benets
of some type as a result of ling an employment discrimination charge (Moss &
Johnsen, 1997; Moss, Johnsen, & Ullman, 1998; Moss, in press).
With additional data, we are able to compare charge resolutions from the initial
three years of implementation (July 26, 1992 through June 30, 1995) with those
from July 1, 1995 through March 31, 1998. Tables 4 and 5 present the results of
the analysis.
Rows 1 and 2 of Table 4 show that benet rates decreased considerably from the
early to the later time period. EEOC eld oces experienced a 7.1% decrease
Table 4. Outcomes of all closed ADA employment discrimination charges investigated by EEOC
and FEA oces by time period
Time period
EEOC FEPA Total
Cases
closed
Benet
rate
(%)
%
cause
determ
Cases
closed
Benet
rate
(%)
%
cause
determ
Cases
closed
Benet
rate
(%)
%
cause
determ
7/26/926/30/95* 28285 16.5 2.9 17105 25.6 1.1 45447 19.9 2.2
7/1/953/31/98 65730 9.4 3.6 34496 22.2 1.4 100347 13.8 2.9
7/1/9512/31/96 11388 8.4 1.5 5678 22.3 1.4 17070 13.0 1.5
1/1/966/30/96 12687 9.1 2.3 6306 21.7 1.1 19007 13.3 1.9
7/1/9612/31/96 11734 9.6 3.5 6349 21.6 1.5 18128 13.7 2.8
1/1/976/30/97 11952 9.3 4.1 6849 22.6 1.6 18840 14.1 3.2
7/1/9712/31/97 11518 10.2 5.8 6004 22.5 1.5 17530 14.4 4.3
1/1/983/31/98 6451 10.2 5.3 3310 22.5 1.5 9772 14.3 4.0
* The number of cases closed during the 7/26/926/30/95 time period by EEOC eld oces and FEPAs
presented in this table dier very slightly from our previous articles. This is because the earlier data,
provided to us by the EEOC in hard copy form, classied approximately 500 cases as being either EEOC
eld oce closures or FEPA closures dierently than they are classied in the newer computerized data
set we recently obtained. Also, there were some rounding dierences within the hard copy data
themselves. Accordingly, the EEOC benet rates in the previous articles were reported as 16.2% (Moss,
in press), and 16.3% (Moss, Johnsen, & Ullman, 1998), in contrast to the 16.5% reported here, and the
FEPA benet rates in the previous article were reported as 26.6%, in contrast to the 25.6% reported
here (Moss, in press).
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( from 16.5% to 9.4%). FEPAs experienced a 3.4 % decrease ( from 25.6% to
22.2%).
As mentioned previously, in June 1995 the EEOC changed its policy of viewing
all charges of discrimination as equivalent to one of assigning priorities to charges.
The implementation of new public policies such as the EEOC's charge priority
policy, especially the beginning of implementation, is often slow and problematic
(Wilson, 1989; Percy, 1989; Blumrosen, 1993). For this reason, we analyzed the
data covering July 1, 1995 through March 31, 1998 in smaller six-month time blocks.
For charges investigated by the EEOC, Table 4 shows an initial very large
decrease ( from 16.5 to 8.4%) in benet rates. Since then, the benet rate has slowly
edged up to 10.2%. However, this 10.2% benet rate (the highest benet rate for
EEOC eld oces in the various time blocks between July 1, 1995 and March 31,
1998) was 6.3% lower than the EEOC benet rate of the July 26, 1992 through
June 30, 1995 time period.
For FEPAs, Table 4 shows an initial decrease ( from 25.6 to 22.3%). Since then,
the rate has remained stable, between 21.6 and 22.6%. The highest benet rate for
FEPAs (22.6%) in the time blocks between July 1, 1995 and March 31, 1998 was
3.0% lower than the FEPA benet rate of the July 26, 1992 through June 30, 1995
time period.
Table 4 reveals that the percentage of ``reasonable cause'' ndings by the EEOC
increased from 2.9 to 5.3% (an 83% increase). The percentage of ``reasonable
cause'' ndings by the FEPAs has remained consistently low, however, increasing
by only .4%: from 1.1% in the earlier time period (7/25/926/30/95) to 1.5% by
the end of the latter time period (7/1/953/31/98).
Table 5 shows the types of benet resulting from ADA charges during the two
dierent time periods. To account for inevitable delays in the implementation of
most major policy changes, we have excluded the initial year of implementation of
the new charge priority policy in this analysis. Of the benecial charges that were
investigated by the EEOC, there was a considerable increase in the percentage of
those resulting in actual monetary benets, in the size of the actual monetary
benets, and in the size of the projected benets (and a decrease in the percentage
Table 5. Type of benet received by charging parties by time period*
7/25/92 6/30/95 7/1/963/31/98
EEOC FEPA Total EEOC FEPA Total
Actual
monetary
benets
Mean $ per closure $15961 $6865 $11924 $20838 $9840 $15272
Median $ per closure $4880 $2000 $3056 $6729 $2500 $4000
No. of closures 2537 2202 4790 2644 2710 5355
% of total rec'd benets 55.5% 55.5% 55.4% 67.0% 60.9% 63.8%
Projected
monetary
benets
Mean $ per closure $23541 $16098 $22068 $26316 $26099 $26254
Median $ per closure $16640 $13500 $15828 $18348 $11980 $16744
No. of closures 1587 401 1993 853 342 1195
% of total rec'd benets 34.7% 10.1% 23.0% 21.6% 7.7% 14.2%
Non-monetary
benets
No. of closures 1679 1794 3527 1436 1812 3248
% of total rec'd benets 36.7% 45.2% 40.8% 36.4% 40.7% 38.7%
* The calculations in Table 5 are based on all charges resulting in benets.
40 K. Moss et al.
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of those resulting in projected monetary benets). Of the benecial charges that
were investigated by the FEPAs, there was also an increase in the percentage of
those that resulted in actual monetary benets, in the size of the actual monetary
benets, and in the size of the projected benets. The increase in average actual
monetary benets for charges investigated by the FEPAs was not as large, however,
as the increase in average actual monetary benets for charges investigated by
EEOC oces. Moreover, there was little dierence between the earlier and later
time periods in median actual monetary benets for benecial charges investigated
by the FEPAs. With regard to average projected monetary benets for benecial
charges investigated by the FEPAs, there was a considerable increase from the
earlier to the later time periods. There was a decrease, however, in median
projected monetary benets for benecial charges investigated by FEPAs.
Variation in Benet Rates Within and Between EEOC
and FEPA Oces
There was considerable variation in benet rates among eld oces of the EEOC,
with rates ranging from 4.5 to 19.2% and an overall benet rate of 11.5%. There
was even more variation in benet rates among the dierent FEPAs, with rates
ranging from 2.5 to 64.6% and an overall benet rate of 23.3%.
DISCUSSION
This article described an investigation of the ADA employment discrimination
charge process. The analyses looked at the types of impairment cited in charges,
the allegations made, and the benets received. Our results make a contribution to
the ongoing debate about the ecacy and eciency of Title I, but must be
interpreted with a proper recognition of their limitations.
Our nding that the two most frequently claimed disabilities in Title I charges
are back impairments and psychiatric disabilities might be fodder for critics who
assert that the ADA is being used by people with ``minor'' disabilities instead of
more ``serious'' or ``traditional'' disabilities such as paralysis, vision, or hearing
impairments. Arguably, this claim reects a misunderstanding of the nature of
back and psychiatric impairments, and, given the Supreme Court's decision in
Bragdon v. Abbott (1998), of the intended scope of the ADA. Many people with
back impairments, psychiatric impairments, neurological impairments, and
impairments related to extremities have substantially limiting disorders but can
make very good employees with reasonable and inexpensive accommodations. Title
I was meant to give those individuals who are qualied the chance to le a charge in
order to improve their chance to work. The fact remains, however, that a large
proportion of those individuals ling charges claim disabilities which are dicult
for employers to assess, which diverge from common perceptions of serious
disabilities, or which implicate concerns about the limits of coverage.
The data also show that most claimants receive unfavorable outcomes. Of the
closed charges, only 2.7% (n 3,869) resulted in determinations of cause and
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15.7% (n 22,883) brought benets of any sort to those who led them. Of these,
60.3% received actual monetary benets and 18% received projected monetary
benets. The average actual monetary award was $13,932 and the median monetary
award was $3,695. A mere 1.7% (n 2,407) of the charges resolved benecially for
complainants resulted either in new jobs or reinstatements.
Furthermore, for the charging parties, results can be signicantly dierent,
depending on whether the charge is led at an EEOC or a FEPA oce. Individuals
who rely on a FEPA to investigate their charge have a greater likelihood of
obtaining a benecial outcome than individuals who rely on the EEOC. However,
proportionately more individuals receiving a benecial outcome are likely to
receive monetary benets from the EEOC than from a FEPA. Further, those who
receive benecial outcomes will probably receive greater monetary benets from
charges investigated by the EEOC than from those investigated by a FEPA.
Do these ndings support the views of those who think that the ADA's employ-
ment provisions are being used by the ``wrong'' people, or are too often being
abused by people without meritorious claims (Bovard, 1995; Mathews, 1995, 1993;
Will, 1996; Zuri, 1996; Olson, 1997)? We think not. First, any sweeping judg-
ments about the success of Title I are premature. Implementation researchers have
found repeatedly that translating important legislative and administrative policies
into action proceeds slowly and requires years of adjustment, compromise, experi-
ence, and ne-tuning (Wilson, 1989; Goldman et al., 1992; Blumrosen, 1993). Our
data show that, at the very least, more than 2,400 individuals with disabilities have
obtained new jobs or have been reinstated into old jobs after only 5 1 2 years of
implementation. In addition, 22,883 individuals are better o in some way during
the same time period. Of these, 16,000 received some kind of monetary benet.
The more important reason for caution in judging the overall success of the
process by these data is that they represent an unknown, and probably small, fraction
of the total number of instances in which the ADA inuences an employment
decision. They do not include instances in which people with disabilities suer
discrimination but take no action. More importantly, charge data do not address
``compliance without enforcement,'' the voluntary non-discriminatory behavior
that would be the best measure of the overall success of the ADA (Burris & Moss, in
press). The existence of the ADA and the authority of the EEOC to enforce it
present a powerful stimulus for employers to comply with its requirements. The
need to respond to a charge, the possibility of investigation by the EEOCor a FEPA,
and the chance of being the target of judicial proceedings stimulate many employers
who do not initially comply to seek settlements when disputes arise. There is a
predominance of legal settlements and ``withdrawal-with-benet'' resolutions
among those who benet from their ADA charges. The nding that 14.5% of
benecial outcomes out of a total of 15.7% are either withdrawal-with-benet
resolutions or formal settlements strongly attests that the presence of the lawand the
risk of administrative enforcement present high motivational impact for employers.
It is only in some cases resulting in withdrawal-with-benet resolutions or
formal settlements that EEOC or FEPA investigators actually are involved in the
negotiations leading to the settlements.
In a similar interpretation of ndings about the consequences of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act on female and African American workers, Blumrosen (1993) described
how the legislation encouraged employers to comply with the values contained in
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the law, notwithstanding demographic and political changes that have reduced the
impact of employment discrimination in recent times. Blumrosen makes an
important point: in considering the impact of equal employment opportunity laws,
statistics about charges and cases reveal only the ``tip of the iceberg.'' The growing
presence of knowledgeable and sophisticated human resource personnel in larger
rms has meant an increase in the implementation of equal employment opportun-
ity laws without direct government intervention (Edelman, 1992). Corporations are
adopting policies to inform managers and workers of ADA requirements and
to help them achieve compliance without direct EEOC or FEPA intervention.
Because of these additions to corporate structure and awareness, EEOC statistics
about charges and lawsuits show only one aspect of the consequences of laws such
as the ADA. Widespread compliance would be expected to produce a pool of
charges in which it is less clear that the individual's claim is meritorious and that
the impairments are ``disabilities'' as dened under the ADA.
There can be little doubt that many Title I charges are frivolous. It does not
follow, however, that the charge process is failing or even that it is being widely
abused. The administrative charge process is designed to provide a relatively
inexpensive and quick means of resolving disputes between workers and employ-
ers. It is very easy for an employee who suspects discrimination to le a charge,
even the employee who lacks hard evidence to support the claim (as is often the
case even in ultimately meritorious cases). There is no fee, no lawyer is required,
and charges can be led by mail or faxed to agencies. The initial screening of weak
or malicious cases, which in standard litigation is performed by lawyers and court
clerks, comes after ling in the ADA charge system.
On the other hand, the data presented here may be cause for concern about the
eectiveness and fairness of the charge process for claimants with meritorious
claims. Our results show that individuals whose employment discrimination charges
were investigated both by EEOC oces and FEPAs during the last several years
were less likely to benet from their charge than those whose charges were investi-
gated during the rst three years of implementation. As previously noted, the last
several years have seen both a growing number of court decisions narrowly inter-
preting the ADA and a change in EEOC charge handling procedures. It is
conceivable that either or both of these factors could have contributed to the
decreasing benet rate. Given that both the EEOC and the FEPAs experienced
reductions in benet rates, it is a reasonable conjecture that, as courts have ruled
against a growing number of ADA plaintis, employers have become less fearful of
sanctions and see less reason to settle with charging parties. A more likely explana-
tion, however, is that both the court decisions and the EEOC's change in its charge
handling procedures have contributed to the reductions. The EEOC's decrease in
benet rates is twice as large as the decrease of the FEPAs. Furthermore, while the
EEOC plans to pay increasing attention to settlement and mediation at all stages of
charge processing, its recent emphasis has been on reducing its inventory and
identifying cases that challenge the most egregious violations (Igasaki & Miller,
1998).
In 1995, an EEOC Task Force was created to assess the FEPA program and the
EEOC's relationship with the FEPAs. The Task Force found that the computers
provided by the EEOC to some of the FEPAs were too small for the volume of
charges they processed. Many FEPAs have data transmission problems due either
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to aging modem equipment or inadequate phone lines. At least seven FEPAs must
duplicate data entry eorts by entering the data into their own system and then
again into CDS. Although many larger FEPAs have a sta person knowledgeable
in computer matters who is responsible for overall data entry, many others have few
or no sta suciently trained in computer procedures. According to the Task
Force, these problems result in slow and inecient data processing as well as
inaccuracies (State and Local Task Force, 1995, p. XII-3).
Our results lend support to the Task Force's conclusions. When examining the
earlier FEPA data provided to us in hard copy form, Moss (in press) found both
some data missing and many unclassied charges (i.e., much more use of the
``other impairment'' category and of unlabeled allegations). Furthermore, in
three of the FEPA oces, large discrepancies were found between the number of
individuals reported as having received benets and the number of reports which
resulted in charges. When examining the newer FEPA data for this article, some
missing data and many unclassied charges were still found. It seems obvious that
eective oversight and administration of EEOC and FEPA eld oces depends on
accurate and timely data entry into the CDS. Without these, it may be dicult to
fully understand the impact of ADA-based employment discrimination charges as
well as the dierences between the EEOC and FEPA charge processing.
CONCLUSION
Perhaps the most important nding in this study is an apparent need for more
uniform implementation of the Title I charge process. People tend to have very
dierent charge outcomes, depending on whether the EEOC or a FEPA processes
and closes a charge. While a much higher percentage of individuals whose charges
are investigated by FEPAs receive benets, a much lower percentage of such
people receive monetary benets. They also may receive very dierent types of
charge outcomes, depending on which particular EEOC oce or FEPA processes
their charge.
During the last several years, the EEOC has taken decisive action in dealing with
some of the problems pertaining to charge processing. It has made progress in
reducing the length of time taken to process charges, in decreasing the inventory of
charges awaiting resolution, in focusing investigative resources onto strong cases,
in increasing its rate of ``reasonable cause'' determinations, and in increasing the
monetary benets received by charging parties. It is hoped that it will now focus
more attention on settling cases, on mediation, 6 and on the nature of charge
resolutions investigated by FEPAs.
In sum, the ndings presented here suggest some correspondence between
the promise of the ADA and actual outcome. They also generally support the
concept of a federal agency directly and uniformly enforcing a federal law that
remains much needed by individuals. If eective and equitable enforcement is
6 The EEOC has recently instituted a mediation program. Its March 1998 report, Priority Charge
Handling and Litigation Task Force Report, stated that the agency has started to see a sizable increase in
the number of mediations occurring at its eld oces as well as an increase in the number of cases
resolved through mediation. In 1999, the EEOC received a substantial budget increase intended in large
part, to dramatically expand the agency's ability to oer mediation.
44 K. Moss et al.
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to be expected from the EEOC, the answer seems to lie more with appropriation
of adequate resources than with dismemberment and shifting enforcement
responsibility into separate state and local enterprises.
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